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Market Efficiency in Person-to-Person Betting 
 
Abstract 
Established gambling operators have argued that person-to-person wagering on Internet 
‘betting exchanges’ represents unfair competition.  In this paper we suggest that, in fact, 
betting exchanges have brought about significant efficiency gains by lowering transaction 
costs for consumers.  We test this hypothesis using matched data on UK horse racing from 
betting exchanges and from traditional betting media.  In contrast to traditional betting media, 
we find that betting exchanges exhibit both weak and strong form market efficiency. 
Further, we find evidence that an information based model explains the well documented 
favourite-longshot bias more convincingly than traditional explanations based on risk 
preferences. 
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Market Efficiency in Person-to-Person Betting 
 
1. Introduction 
The growth in importance of person-to-person wagers on the Internet (‘betting exchanges’) 
represents an interesting phenomenon for researchers studying the efficiency of financial 
markets.  Having been introduced as recently as 2000, Internet betting exchanges, which give 
bettors the opportunity to bet directly with each other, have grown rapidly in terms of 
turnover.  Betfair currently claim to match about 500,000 bets per day 
(http://www.betfairpromo.com/1soccer/index.asp?rfr=235&sid=35). 
Existing gambling operators have lobbied strongly for tougher regulation of betting 
exchanges on the grounds that they permit traders on the exchanges to act as bookmakers 
without having to register and pay tax as such.  Because of their much lower margins, the 
current betting tax structure, which is levied on margins, also benefits the exchanges 
disproportionately, it is argued, compared with traditional bookmakers. 
An alternative perspective is that betting exchanges represent an innovation that has 
improved information flows to consumers and lowered barriers to entry for producers.  We 
might expect that, in this environment, the implied reduction in transaction costs would lead 
to an increase in both productive and allocative efficiency relative to other wagering markets. 
There is, in fact, a long and established literature examining the efficiency of betting 
markets, much of it focusing on the existence of weak form inefficiencies such as the 
‘favourite-longshot bias’ whereby bets placed at shorter odds (‘favourites’) tend to yield a 
higher expected return than bets at longer odds (‘longshots’) - see Sauer (1998), Vaughan 
Williams (1999) for surveys of the literature. 
Hurley and McDonough (1995) offer a theoretical model of the favourite-longshot 
bias based on the existence of positive transaction and information costs faced by bettors. 
Sobel and Raines (2003) go further, seeking to test an information model empirically against 
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the risk preference alternative, using an extensive dataset of prices drawn from nearly three 
thousand races at two US greyhound tracks.  We test this information model using new data 
from betting exchanges and traditional betting markets, and in so doing compare the bias in 
these two competing markets. 
 First, however, we explain (in Section 2) more fully the operation of betting 
exchanges.  In Section 3, we consider explicitly the importance of transaction costs and 
information in market efficiency.  We introduce our data and empirical methodology in 
Sections 4 and 5 respectively and present our empirical results in Section 6.  We make some 
concluding remarks in the final section. 
 
2. Internet Betting Exchanges 
Betting exchanges exist to match people who want to bet on a future outcome at a given price 
with others who are willing to offer that price.  The person who bets on the event happening 
at a given price is the backer.  The person who offers the price is known as the layer. 
The advantage of this form of betting for the bettor is that, by allowing anyone with 
access to a betting exchange to offer or lay odds, it serves to reduce margins in the odds 
compared to the best odds on offer with traditional bookmakers.  Exchanges allow clients to 
act as a backer or layer at will, and indeed to back and lay the same event at different times 
during the course of the market. 
The way in which this operates is that the major betting exchanges present clients 
with the three best odds and stakes which other members of the exchange are offering or 
asking for.  For example, for England to beat Australia at cricket the best odds on offer to 
those wishing to back England might be 3 to 1, to a maximum stake of £80, 2.5 to 1 to a 
further stake of £100 and 2 to 1 to a further stake of £500.  This means that potential backers 
can stake up to a maximum of £80 on England to beat Australia at odds of 3 to 1, a further 
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£100 at 2.5 to 1 and a further £500 at 2 to 1.  These odds, and the staking levels available, 
may have been offered by one or more other clients who believe that the true odds were 
longer than they offered. 
An alternative option available to potential backers is to enter the odds at which they 
would be willing to place a bet, together with the stake they are willing to wager at that odds 
level.  This request (say £50 at 4 to 1) may be accommodated by a layer or layers at any time 
until the event takes place. 
The margin between the best odds on offer and the best odds sought tends to narrow 
as more clients offer and lay bets, so that in popular markets the real margin against the bettor 
(or layer) tends towards the commission levied (normally on winning bets) by the exchange. 
 
3. A Cost-based Model of the Favourite-longshot Bias 
Early models of the favourite-longshot bias suggested that bettors are ‘risk loving’ (see, for 
example, Rosett 1965; Weitzman 1965).  More recent studies, however, have attributed the 
bias to the existence of transactions and information costs. In particular, Hurley and 
McDonough (1995) suggest that the extent of any bias may be positively related to the 
transaction costs faced by bettors as a class in acquiring information concerning the true 
probabilities of runners, as well as by the magnitude of the ‘take’ or deductions, i.e. the profit 
margin or administrative costs of market operators. 
In their model, Hurley and McDonough consider the case of risk-neutral bettors 
occupying a parimutuel betting market.  In the absence of transactions or information costs, 
bettors are able to calculate the ‘true’ probabilities of each outcome, so that the subjective 
probabilities about each potential outcome (as contained in the odds) will equal the objective 
probabilities about each outcome, i.e. no bias.  The presence of positive transactions and 
information costs, however, causes the subjective probability that the ‘favourite’ (defined as 
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the horse with the highest objective win probability) wins to diverge systematically from the 
objective probability.  In the limit, bettors will be totally uninformed and so will bet equal 
amounts on each outcome, regardless of the objective probabilities, i.e. they will bet 
relatively too much on the options with a low probability of success and too little on those 
with a high probability of success.  This is the classic favourite-longshot bias and the bias 
will exist insofar as transactions and information costs discourage bettors from becoming 
totally informed.  It follows also that the bias would increase as these costs increase. 
Although the Hurley and McDonough proposition was not supported by their 
experimental evidence, there is, in fact, an emerging body of empirical evidence gathered 
from horse race markets that is consistent with their hypothesis.  For example, Vaughan 
Williams & Paton (1997) find that the favourite-longshot bias is more pronounced in low-
grade races than in high class races.  This finding is consistent with a reasonable assumption 
that the cost of acquiring information relevant to the race outcomes is higher for low-grade 
races than high class contests, because there is likely to be less public and media scrutiny of 
low grade runners. 
Sobel and Raines (2003) offer further supporting evidence for an information-based 
explanation, identifying a lower bias in high volume betting markets, assumed to be better 
informed, than low volume markets, assumed to be proportionately more heavily populated 
by casual bettors.  The starting point for building their information model is to show that in 
the absence of any information regarding race outcomes, the expected proportion of public 
bets made on each runner in a pari-mutuel market will be 1/N, where N is the number of race 
entrants.  This represents the limiting case of extreme bias.  To the extent that the betting 
public acquire race specific information to inform their assessment of the true chances of 
individual runners, the actual degree of bias will depart from this limiting case and the 
proportions bet will approach more closely the distribution of objective probabilities.  The 
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degree of bias is therefore largely a function of the amount of information available to bettors 
and the number of runners in the race.  Using a substantial dataset of greyhound racing pari-
mutuel prices, Sobel and Raines measure the bias in a subset of races associated with a high 
proportion of ‘serious’ bettors (weekday races), and compare with a subset associated with a 
high proportion of ‘casual’ bettors (weekends), in order to test the model.  They find evidence 
of a conventional favourite-longshot bias associated with a high proportion of casual bettors, 
and of an opposite favourite-longshot bias (due to over-reaction to information) in the 
presence of a high proportion of ‘serious’ bettors, substantiating their information model. 
Sobel and Raines also demonstrate a clear relationship between the degree of bias and 
the number of race entrants, and show that this finding is at odds with the predictions of risk 
preference models.  They usefully specify testable models of risk and information 
explanations of bias as functional relationships between subjective and objective 
probabilities, enabling empirical arbitration between the two models.  Their tests of the 
models, including controls for race grade, time of day, and bet complexity, suggest that the 
information model explains the markets they examine better than the risk preference 
alternative. 
In this paper we seek to build upon the work of Hurley and McDonough and Sobel 
and Raines in order to examine the influence of transactions and information costs on the 
existence of the favourite-longshot bias.  We use Shin’s methodology (Shin 1991, 1992, 
1993) to calculate the bias for a sample of races, firstly in respect of prices from traditional 
bookmaking markets, and secondly in respect of betting exchange prices for the same races.  
The Shin approach has been employed in other recent papers studying the structural and 
behavioural characteristics of betting markets (see, for example, Cain, Peel and Law, 2001a, 
2001b, 2003).  Shin developed a systematic theoretical model that accounts for the bias by 
reference to insider activity, specifying an informational hierarchy comprising of insiders 
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(who are assumed to have certain knowledge of race outcomes), price setters (bookmakers, 
who are monopoly price setters) and outsiders (relatively casual recreational bettors).  Shin 
models the behaviour of bookmakers, arguing that they engineer the favourite-longshot bias 
to pass the cost of losses due to insider activity on to outsiders (for a concise, formal 
summary of the Shin model, see Law and Peel 2002, appendix). 
The level of commission levied across markets in the betting exchange that we 
consider (Betfair, the world’s largest betting exchange) is normally set at a maximum of 5% 
of winnings.  This is considerably less than the notional profit margin of bookmakers implied 
in the ‘over-round’, i.e. the sum of probabilities implied in the odds minus 1, which averages 
at 25.63% in our 700 race sample (based on mean bookmaker prices).  If the costs-based 
explanation of the bias is correct, therefore, we should expect the favourite-longshot bias to 
be more pronounced in the bookmaker data. 
In addition we test the effects of information costs associated with race class, adopting 
a procedure similar to that used by Vaughan Williams and Paton (1997), whereby races are 
classified by betting volume/grade as a proxy for information intensity.  In particular, we 
measure the favourite-longshot bias for each information class within the exchange data, and 
separately within the bookmaker data.  The null hypothesis is that the degree of bias across 
information classes is equal.  Finally, we seek to arbitrate between information and risk 
preference explanations of bias by employing the Sobel and Raines methodology, testing 
functional relationships between subjective and objective probabilities associated with these 
alternative models against our data. 
 
4. Data used in this study 
The first set of prices collected were those offered by bookmakers.  Unlike pari-mutuel 
prices, these odds are fixed, regardless of subsequent fluctuations in the market; the only 
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exception to this is when there are withdrawals of runners in the race, in which case a 
differential reduction is applied, based on the probability of success of the withdrawn runner 
or runners. 
Bookmakers’ prices were gathered for 799 horse races run in the UK during 2002.  
Sample races were drawn from the second half of the 2001-02 National Hunt season, the 
2002 Flat season, and the beginning of the 2002-03 National Hunt season. In order to 
minimise liquidity issues, sampling was restricted to Saturdays and other days where overall 
betting turnover was likely to be vigorous.  One advantage of sampling over the full calendar 
year 2002 is that our data should not suffer in aggregate from seasonal bias.  Prices were 
taken from the Internet site of the Racing Post, the major daily publication dealing with horse 
racing and gambling in the U.K.  Taking prices from the Internet site allows for a real-time 
comparison with betting exchange data, also acquired online. 
Our aim was to establish as complete a set of prices as possible as early in the market 
as possible.  To ensure that prices were not merely nominal, a trial was conducted whereby 
bets were placed to establish that the prices stated could be obtained.  Actual bets were small 
(ranging from £5 to £20), but enquiries were also made with individual bookmakers as to 
whether much larger bets would be accepted.  There was evidence of some limits to bet size 
set by bookmakers on occasions, but not frequently enough to raise concerns about the 
integrity of prices in general or to suggest a lack of liquidity that might require qualification 
of the results presented here. 
We calculated the mean of bookmakers’ prices for each runner in each race, to enable 
us to develop a measure of bias that could be compared directly with that of previous studies.  
In addition, we identified the most favourable price for each horse (the outlier), as this is an 
important competitive benchmark against which betting exchange prices are compared by 
bettors.   
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The bookmaker data were matched with corresponding betting exchange prices, 
collected at the same time each day, 10.30 a.m.  Bet limits on betting exchanges are explicit, 
and evidenced by the amounts layers state that they are prepared to accept in bets on 
individual runners (as outlined above).  Where bet limits were small, the prices offered were 
ignored, and races where overall betting volume was trivially low were excluded from the 
sample of races, on the grounds that the market did not have sufficient liquidity to warrant 
treating such observations as representative1.  A minimum acceptable aggregate turnover 
threshold (£2000 per race, by 10.30 am) was applied as a filter to the races in the sample in 
respect of Betfair prices; races where this turnover threshold was not met were screened out 
of the analysis.  After exclusion of races on grounds of turnover or recent withdrawals, we 
were left with exactly 700 races for the analysis. 
As a measure of information intensity, we divided our information classes according 
to betting volume, which is highly correlated with other relevant qualitative criteria such as 
racecourse grade, information on runners, media coverage, and prize money. The 
classification, including typical associated qualitative race criteria, was as follows: 
Class 1: Races with low betting volume. These are mostly at low grade racetracks 
and for small monetary prizes; often unexposed or unknown form for a number of 
runners; minimal media coverage. 
Class 2: Races with moderate betting volume. These usually attract middle ability 
horses; form is more exposed than Class 1 races; average prize money. 
                                                 
1 To avoid sample bias, we were careful to exclude only races where turnover was low with both 
Betfair and bookmakers, as evidenced explicitly on the Betfair website, and by inference from bet sizes in trade 
press results sections in the case of bookmakers, and enquiries made with bookmakers as to bet limits. 
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Class 3: Races with higher than average betting volume. These are competitive 
races with a high degree of betting interest, generated by characteristics of the race or 
its contenders likely to attract public interest and enhanced media coverage; higher 
than average reported betting volumes in the press. 
Class 4: Races with very high betting volume. High profile and top class races; high 
profile contending horses; high degree of competition and media interest, speculation 
on runners often extending weeks before the contest. 
These classes are not official race categories.  They are primarily distinguished by 
betting turnover, as a proxy for the degree of media publicity and other qualitative aspects 
outlined in the class descriptions above.  Official industry race classes were not used for our 
purpose, as it is far from clear that these are closely correlated to the amount of public 
information about runners.  Many horses in high-class two-year old races, for example, are 
relatively unexposed to prior public scrutiny.  Table 1 summarises the distribution of races in 
our sample between the four information categories. 
 In order to distinguish between information and risk preference explanations of the 
observed market structures, we needed a further classification of prices to facilitate 
estimation of the functional relationship between subjective and objective probabilities in our 
data.  We employed a method of classification traceable to Weitzman (1965), whereby 
normalised odds probabilities are categorised according to a measure of the monetary return 
to a nominal winner at given odds to a unit bet, including stake.  This largely solved the 
problem of specifying classes having an insignificant number of runners, especially in the 
shortest odds categories.  Table 2 summarises the normalised odds probabilities of horses in 
our sample, categorised by Weitzman category. 
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5. Empirical Methodology 
Our measure of the favourite-longshot bias is derived from the model constructed by Shin 
(1993, pg.1148), which explains the favourite-longshot bias as a result of bookmaker 
behaviour in the face of insider trading.  Shin shows that, in equilibrium, the sum of price 
probabilities offered by bookmakers will exceed 1, such that: 
Di = z(n-1)i + ∑ aknikVar (p)i + ∑ bknik [Var (p)]2i    (1) 
where D is the sum of prices in race i, expressed as probabilities minus one; n is the number 
of runners; and Var (p) is the “variance” of price probabilities for the runners in the race2. 
The coefficient of n-1, z, is the measure of insider trading, and the higher the value of 
z, the greater the degree of bias.  For his sample of 178 races in the early 1990s, Shin 
estimated z to be 0.025, i.e. 2.5% of betting turnover could be attributed to insiders. 
 Shin uses an iterative ordinary least squares method to estimate z in his sample of 
races, beginning the process with an initial estimate of z from the observed variance of prices 
within the races, used as a proxy for variance of probabilities.  The value of z is re-estimated 
by using this initial value, and the iterative process is repeated until convergence is achieved. 
This estimating procedure, replicated in the later studies by Vaughan Williams and Paton 
(1997), and by Cain, Law and Peel (2001a), is also adopted here.  In each case, we restrict the 
polynomial in equation (1) to k = 2.  In accordance with Shin (1992) and Vaughan Williams 
and Paton (1997), using higher values of k has very little impact on our results. 
Shin’s z offers a robust method of analysing the degree of bias in specific races and 
has the further useful property that it does not require an estimate of true probabilities based 
on results, permitting application to a much smaller set of races. 
                                                 
2 Shin does not use the term variance in its usual sense; rather, Var (p) is a measure of distance of vector p from 
the vector 1/n. 
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 We wish to obtain estimates of the value of z in equation 1 for the three different 
prices.  The prices all pertain to the same set of races.  Given this, we exploit potential 
correlations in the residual terms by estimating equation 1 for each set of prices using the 
seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) technique.  SUR enables us to achieve gains in 
efficiency in the presence of correlations in error term across the three models.  A further 
advantage of the SUR approach is that it enables us to test directly the equality of coefficients 
(in our case, the estimate of z) across the three equations. 
 Recall that the cost based model predicts that the level of bias will be systematically 
higher in cases when transaction costs are higher.  In terms of the Sobel and Raines model 
this is because fewer ‘serious’ bettors will wish to be involved when transaction costs are 
high. The first empirical consequence of this proposition is that the estimated value of z for 
the outlier bookmaker prices should be lower than that for the mean bookmaker prices.3.  
Secondly, the estimated value of z for the Betfair prices should be lower than for either set of 
bookmaker prices.  To the extent that our classification of races into different classes proxies 
for the costs to consumers of obtaining information about form, a third empirical 
consequence is that the estimated value of z should be lower, the higher is the class of race. 
 In addition to testing the transaction cost/information based model we wish to 
consider the adequacy of the alternative risk preference explanation of the favourite-longshot 
bias in relation to the same data, employing the methodology of Sobel and Raines. 
 Building on Rosett (1965), Sobel and Raines specify the risk model as: 
 log (ρi) = α + βlog(πi)        (2) 
                                                 
3 The outlier prices may also offer ‘quasi-arbitrage’ trading opportunities for the bettor, i.e. opportunities to 
trade at prices better than the objective probabilities, assuming that the mean of the prices on offer is a good 
reflection of the true chances of the runners (see Paton and Vaughan Williams, 2005; Smith, Paton and Vaughan 
Williams, 2005). 
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where ρi is the subjective probability of horse i winning, and πi  is the corresponding objective 
probability.  Further, they derive an information model using a process of Bayesian updating, 
specified as: 
 ρi  =  α + βπI         (3) 
 In both cases β is a measure of the favourite-longshot bias, with 0 < β < 1 indicating 
over betting of longshots relative to runners at short odds, and β > 1 indicating an opposite 
favourite-longshot bias. 
In estimating these models for the data in our sample, we adopt normalised mean 
bookmaker prices for each horse as the observed values of ρi. We exploit our finding of very 
little bias in the betting exchanges (see next section) to estimate objective probabilities, 
utilising normalised betting exchange prices for runners as a proxy for πi.  Mean values for ρi 
and πi are established for the Weitzman categories, as summarised in Table 2, and 
subsequently used in a weighted least squares regression to estimate equations (2) and (3). 
A further test performed by Sobel and Raines is to establish the point at which the 
subjective and objective probability lines cross; they demonstrate that for the information 
model this crossing point is at π = 1/N, whereas for the risk preference model the 
corresponding crossing point is at π = λ1/1-β, suggesting that the degree of bias is independent 
of the number of entrants in a race. 
 Should the estimation of equation (3) fit the data in our sample better than a similar 
estimation of equation (2), this would provide empirical support for the proposition that the 
information model better explains the favourite-longshot bias than the risk preference model. 
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Further, if the crossing point of subjective and probability lines corresponding to our data is 
close to 1/N, this will also provide empirical support for the information model. 
 
6. Results and discussion 
In respect of the Shin z estimates, our results are reported in Table 3 to 8.  In all cases, the 
Breusch-Pagan test rejects the null that the residuals in the three equations are independent 
and this provides support for our use of the SUR methodology. 
We report the SUR results of equation 1 with the three different sets of prices for the 
whole sample in Table 3. Recall that the bias (Shin’s z value) is given by the estimated 
coefficient on the variable n-1.  For the mean fixed odds data, the bias is estimated to be 
2.17%, a figure broadly comparable with the estimates derived from starting prices by Shin 
(1993) and Vaughan Williams and Paton (1997), using a similar methodology4.  When we 
use the outlier fixed odds data, the bias reduces to 1.19%.  These values are significantly 
higher than the corresponding figure for the betting exchange data, where the bias is just 
0.9%, offering support for the Hurley and McDonough proposition that the degree of 
favourite-longshot bias will be more pronounced when trading costs are higher.  In terms of 
the Sobel and Raines model, a lower conventional bias in the exchanges relative to traditional 
betting markets is consistent with a higher proportion of ‘serious’ bettors on the exchanges 
than with bookmakers5.  The formal tests that pairs of these coefficients are equal (reported 
in Table 8), confirm that the estimated bias in the exchange data is significantly lower than 
both the mean and outlier fixed odds data. 
                                                 
4 An alternative approach to that of Shin in which the favourite-longshot bias is estimated directly is suggested 
in Schnytzer and Shilony (1995).  Using this approach led to a very similar ordering of the bias across each of 
the three price formats to that reported here. 
 
5 We have no empirical data to suggest that the proportion of casual bettors is greater with bookmakers than the 
exchanges but recent evidence submitted to a UK parliamentary committee considering gambling legislation 
suggests a significant degree of non- recreational trading on the betting exchanges. 
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We now consider the degree of bias associated with the four information classes.  As 
discussed above, an important implication of the Hurley and McDonough and the Sobel and 
Raines hypotheses is that there will be a positive relationship between costs involved in 
acquiring race specific information, and the degree of favourite-longshot bias. We therefore 
expect the values of Shin z to decrease as we progress from the subset of races associated 
with the least public information (Class 1) through to that associated with most public 
information (Class 4).  This proposition is borne out by the Shin z values across information 
sets for all three price formats (reported in Tables 4-7 and in Figure 1).  Unequivocal support 
for this element of the hypothesis would require that z decreases monotonically from Class 1 
to Class 4.  Whereas only for the betting exchange data is this strict condition met, the overall 
trends in z for the bookmaker data are also clearly decreasing.  The tests of equality of 
coefficients across the three sets of prices (summarised in Table 8) give confidence in the 
systematic nature of these overall structural trends.  The only exception is the Betfair/outlier 
test of equality at Class 1.  As Class 1 in our information hierarchy coincides with lower 
turnover races, it is likely that this anomaly is caused by a reduced degree of price 
competition between layers on the exchange, with a number of prices filtered out by our 
turnover rule; this lack of competitive pricing would not be as apparent in respect of outliers 
as bookmakers may feel obliged to offer a full set of competitive prices, despite low public 
interest, to maintain credibility.  In these circumstances one could expect to encounter a 
liquidity limit to further reductions in the degree of bias in the betting exchange.  
Nonetheless, exchange prices remain competitive with outliers, emphasising the importance 
of the latter as a benchmark for exchange layers. 
The evidence is, therefore, consistent overall with an information and cost-based 
modelling of the favourite-longshot bias. 
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Intuitively, it may seem paradoxical that the extent of insider trading should be lowest 
in the exchanges, where traders possessing inside information have arguably the greatest 
opportunity to exploit this knowledge by, for example, laying high odds against non-triers 
winning.  Our results are not inconsistent with this intuitive reasoning, although they do 
suggest that insider trading is not as commonplace on exchanges as sometimes portrayed in 
the media.  To demonstrate this consistency, if we consider the standard errors of the 
estimates of Shin z presented in Tables 4-7, they are without exception highest for the betting 
exchange values, despite lower estimates of z.  This implies that although the degree of bias 
is overall less in the structure of exchange prices, the impact of specific items of insider 
information is likely to be more evident and exaggerated in particular races than is the case 
for the bookmaker data.  In other words, our results do not deny the existence of isolated 
cases of insider activity in the exchanges – rather, they suggest that such activity is not 
widespread. 
A further implication of the interpretation of the favourite-longshot bias suggested 
here is that it would be unwise to attribute the observed bias in bookmaker prices solely to 
bookmaker insurance against asymmetric information, as in the Shin model.  The transaction 
cost and information models explain the observed pattern of bookmaker prices equally well.  
A question arises as to whether it is legitimate to use a measure of bias (Shin’s z) explicitly 
derived from a model of bookmaker behaviour, to propose a model not based on this initial 
premise.  Shin models bookmaker competition, whereas the person-to-person exchange 
consists of individuals who do not need to maintain a credible market structure embracing all 
runners.  Aside from the degree of bias and level of transaction costs, however, the 
competitive structure of exchange markets resembles that of Shin’s bookmaking market quite 
closely.  For example, the dynamics of the market are such that, for individual runners, 
exchange layers have to offer competitive prices to attract bettors, with the sum of price 
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probabilities usually exceeding one by only a few percent.  On the other hand, the occasions 
when the sum of probabilities falls below one are extremely rare (these characteristics are 
confirmed by observation of our sample races).  We feel justified, therefore, in applying the 
Shin z measure in this non-bookmaker betting medium. 
 In judging whether an information model explains the favourite-longshot bias better 
than a risk preference model, we estimated the Sobel and Raines specifications expressed in 
equations (2) and (3) above.  The coefficients α and β corresponding to each equation, 
estimated from observed values of ρ (based on bookmaker mean prices), and π (exchange 
prices employed as a proxy), are summarised in Table 9.  Figure 2 shows fitted and actual 
values of ρ plotted against π for the risk model, whilst Figure 3 plots the corresponding 
values for the information model.  The information model appears to fit the data much more 
closely than the risk alternative.  Figure 3, in fact, suggests an almost perfect fit. This 
empirical finding corresponds very closely to the Sobel and Raines result, supporting their 
conclusion that an information based explanation of the favourite-longshot bias is more 
robust than one based on risk preference. 
 Finally, we consider the crossing points of the subjective and objective probability 
functions (in Figures 2 and 3 the latter would be represented by a 45% line through the 
origin). Recall that the information model predicts that the crossing point will be at π = 1/N. 
As the mean number of race entrants in our sample is 11.8, we therefore expect the lines to 
cross at a value of 1/11.8 = 0.0847.  Substituting ρ = π into equation (3) gives a resulting 
crossing point at π = α /(1- β), which from Table 9 yields a value of 0.0849.  This is virtually 
identical to 1/N, offering further empirical support for the information model. 
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7. Conclusions 
In this study we have shown that the established favourite-longshot bias is demonstrably 
lower in person-to-person (exchange) betting than in traditional betting markets.  As these 
exchange betting markets are characterised by relatively low transactions costs, our findings 
are consistent with models in which such costs can help to explain the favourite-longshot 
bias.  We further find that, in both exchange and traditional betting markets, the level of bias 
is lower the greater the amount of public information that is available to traders. Additional 
empirical support for an information based model is found by employing an alternative 
methodology which enables us to arbitrate between information based and risk preference 
models of the favourite-longshot bias in relation to our data.  Our results suggest that an 
information model explains the favourite-longshot bias better than a risk preference model. 
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Table 1: Distribution of races by information class 
Information class Races 
1 171 
2 265 
3 137 
4 127 
Total 700 
 
 
 
Table 2: Normalised odds probabilities (Weitzman classes) 
 Return(i) 
No. of 
horses(ii) 
Subjective 
probability(iii)
Objective 
probability(iii) 
1 13 0.5512 0.5933 
2 49 0.4481 0.4666 
3 134 0.3272 0.3391 
4 261 0.2492 0.2571 
5 305 0.1991 0.2064 
6 344 0.1672 0.1732 
7 364 0.1434 0.1481 
8 373 0.1253 0.1295 
9 356 0.1113 0.1129 
10 376 0.0999 0.1030 
11 321 0.0911 0.0923 
12 306 0.0835 0.0848 
13 421 0.0756 0.0751 
15 496 0.0668 0.0668 
17 667 0.0574 0.0563 
21 856 0.0476 0.0452 
26 721 0.0380 0.0340 
34 629 0.0300 0.0256 
41 429 0.0241 0.0184 
51 361 0.0196 0.0135 
67 233 0.0146 0.0095 
101 124 0.0102 0.0060 
151 and over 119 0.0054 0.0036 
N 8258   
Average no. of 11.8   
race entrants (N)    
 1/N 0.0848   
Notes: 
(i) Return to a unit stake bet on a nominal winner, inclusive of stake. 
(ii) Categorised according to mean bookmaker odds. 
(iii) Mean value for all horses in the category. 
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Table 3: SUR Estimates of the Shin over-round function D: all races 
  Mean Outlier Betfair 
n-1 0.0217*** 0.0119*** 0.0090*** 
 (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0005) 
V -26.856*** -18.042*** -11.366*** 
 (2.189) (2.170) (2.718) 
Nv 8.095*** 4.662*** 3.758*** 
 (0.4282) (0.4300) (0.5233) 
n2v -0.4276*** -0.2380*** -0.2625*** 
 (0.0217) (0.0221) (0.0264) 
V2 1111.340*** 622.428*** 632.404*** 
 (115.761) (109.765) (138.865) 
Nv2 -310.588*** -160.578*** -196.288*** 
 (34.453) (32.554) (41.824) 
n2v2 16.135*** 8.256*** 13.017*** 
 (2.584) (2.442) (3.048) 
R2 0.9698 0.9042 0.6049 
N 700 700 700 
Independence 760.52*** 
Notes: 
(i) Estimates are from the final stage of the iterative process as described in the text. 
(ii) The dependent variable is D = sum of price probabilities minus one (equation 1). 
(iii) Figures in brackets are standard errors.  *** indicates significance at the 1% level; ** at the 5% level; * at 
the 10% level. 
(iv) Independence indicates the Breusch-Pagan test that the equations are independent.  The test statistic is 
distributed as χ2(3). 
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 Table 4: SUR Estimates of the Shin function D: Class 1 races 
  Mean Outlier Betfair 
n-1 0.0258*** 0.0132*** 0.0182*** 
 (0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0016) 
V -4.709 -6.809 14.978 
 (5.458) (6.412) (10.953) 
Nv 2.851** 1.078 -2.086 
 (1.118) (1.317) (2.204) 
N2v -0.2092*** 0.0149 -0.1087 
 (0.0560) (0.0665) (0.1063) 
V2 272.314 -47.958 196.135 
 (240.570) (268.694) (458.517) 
nv2 -115.416 71.602 -181.077 
 (81.873) (94.806) (166.986) 
N2v2 8.102 -10.122 24.533 
  (7.488) (8.812) (15.652) 
R2 0.9828 0.9278 0.7548 
N 171 171 171 
Independence 94.40*** 
See Table 3, notes (i) to (iv) 
 
 
 
 
Table 5: SUR Estimates of the Shin function D: Class 2 races 
  Mean Outlier Betfair 
n-1 0.0261*** 0.0147*** 0.0124*** 
 (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0009) 
V -21.045*** -14.684*** -6.920 
 (3.575) (3.625) (4.608) 
Nv 6.981*** 4.115*** 2.611** 
 (0.8128) (0.8308) (1.033) 
N2v -0.4641*** -0.2767*** 0.2547*** 
 (0.0483) (0.0500) (0.0600) 
V2 1020.799*** 564.807** 539.283* 
 (230.061) (232.228) (273.593) 
nv2 -312.503*** -170.358** -181.400* 
 (72.273) (73.450) (85.851) 
N2v2 20.298*** 12.243** 14.491* 
  (5.677) (5.786) (6.635) 
R2 0.9755 0.9156 0.6907 
N 265 265 265 
Independence 312.86***  
See Table 3, notes (i) to (iv) 
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Table 6: SUR Estimates of the Shin function D: Class 3 races 
  Mean Outlier Betfair 
n-1 0.0186*** 0.0105*** 0.0052*** 
 (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0008) 
V -20.879*** -14.002*** -9.025 
 (4.850) (5.314) (6.013) 
Nv 7.165*** 4.031*** 2.803*** 
 (0.8985) (0.9918) (1.075) 
N2v -0.2767*** -0.1670*** -0.1351*** 
 (0.0424) (0.0473) (0.0502) 
V2 1154.01*** 755.033* 152.903 
 (407.163) (412.894) (446.454) 
nv2 -280.511** -181.760 -21.920 
 (124.598) (123.729) (137.868) 
N2v2 2.368 4.443 -3.203 
  (9.189) (9.200) (10.561) 
R2 0.9856 0.9414 0.6891 
N 137 137 137 
Independence 116.76*** 
See Table 3, notes (i) to (iv) 
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Table 7: SUR Estimates of the Shin function D: Class 4 races 
  Mean Outlier Betfair 
n-1 0.0173*** 0.0089*** 0.0038*** 
 (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0007) 
V -38.961*** -20.106** -16.812** 
 (8.283) (8.995) (7.210) 
Nv 8.981*** 4.191*** 3.312*** 
 (1.912) (1.318) (1.029) 
N2v -0.3580*** -0.1546*** -0.1442*** 
 (0.0447) (0.0502) (0.0396) 
V2 787.121*** 342.393 454.209** 
 (245.831) (251.637) (205.910) 
nv2 -154.164** -54.260 -105.455 
 (78.255) (78.174) (66.063) 
N2v2 2.995 0.2528 5.517 
  (5.893) (5.855) (4.947) 
R2 0.9725 0.8966 0.5333 
N 127 127 127 
Independence 104.14*** 
Notes: 
See Table 3, notes (i) to (iv) 
 
 
Table 8: Results of null hypotheses tests: equality of z values across price formats 
Classes 1 to 4 (information sub-sets) 
H0: Mean = Outlier Mean = Betfair Betfair = Outlier 
All races 1848.38*** 960.68*** 42.26*** 
Class 1 946.27*** 348.26*** 0.09 
Class 2 1291,36*** 715.75*** 29.48*** 
Class 3 1191.89*** 853.05*** 79.28*** 
Class 4 1007.80*** 670.06*** 60.10*** 
Notes: 
(i) Tests are of the null hypothesis that the value of z (i.e. the coefficient on n-1) is the same for the respective 
samples. 
(ii) *** indicates significance at the 1% level. 
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Table 9: Coefficients for the Risk Preference and Information based models 
 Risk model Information model 
α  -0.3103*** 0.0050*** 
 (0.0399) (0.0004) 
β 0.8655*** 0.9405*** 
 (0.0132) (0.0038) 
R2 0.9976 0.9998 
N 23 23 
Note: 
*** indicates significance at the 1% level. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Shin z coefficients for bookmakers mean, bookmakers outlier, and betting 
exchange prices 
0.00
0.50
1.00
1.50
2.00
2.50
3.00
1 2 3 4
Information classes
Sh
in
 z mean
outlier
betfair
 
Notes: 
(i) The y axis shows the coefficient of n-1, or Shin’s z, multiplied by 100. The interpretation of this value is that it indicates 
the percentage of insider trading volume in the market concerned, and also acts as a direct proxy measure of the degree of 
bias. 
(ii) Class 1 = least public information; Class 4 = most public information. 
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Figure 2: Estimated relationship between subjective and objective probabilities: the risk 
preference model 
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Figure 3: Estimated relationship between subjective and objective probabilities: 
the information model 
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